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Commodity futures prices have biases due to risk premia and
expectational errors, thus limiting their usefulness as a short-
term  price forecasting tool.  Also, futures  prices are more
adaptive to spot price movements than price expectations, but
not necessarily more rational.  x  ,t
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The International  Commodity Markets Division (CM)  of the  World
Bank started forecasting primary commodity prices more than two
decades ago. The forecasts  have been prepared mainly for  the Bank's
internal  use  in  project  evaluation  and  balance-of-payments
forecasting.  As such, the forecast  accuracy, or forecast  biases and
informational efficiency, has been a major concern and the subject
of  occas_.onal  retrospective  studies.  Two  recent  examples  are
Castelli et al. (1985)  and  Warr (1988).  Their main conclusions  were
that  the  forecasts  have  been  biased  and  also  informationally
inefficient; that the forecasters have tended to adhere too long
to their previous forecasts.
Furthermore, these studies found some evidence that commodity
specialists' forecasts have been outperformed by "naive" (static)
forecasts,1  prompting the suggestion that for the purpose of short-
term  (up to one year)  forecasting it may be better  to rely on
current  spot  prices  or  futures  prices.  Theoretically,  this
proposition  derives  its  rationale  from  the  belief  that  the
commodity futures  markets are efficient and  that the futures  prices
incorporate all available information about the expected future
spot prices. If so, commodity specialists would  not be able to
outperform the futures prices.
However, a large and growing number of empirical studies of
futures market  efficiency have mostly  rejected the unbiasedness
hypothesis of futures prices as a predictor of the future spot
rates. Typically, futures  prices underforecast the subsequent spot
prices. Although there has been a consensus regarding the existence
and direction of the futures price bias, opinions are divided as
to its causes. Hansen and Hodrick (1980), for example, assume that
the investors are risk averse  and the biases represent  time-varying
risk  premia.  The  underprediction  therefore,  should  not  be
interpreted  as  evidence  of  market  inefficiency  or  irrational
expectations. Other researchers have assumed that agents are risk
neural and, therefcre, attribute the biases to market inefficiency
and the failure of rational expectations  .2
Carrying the Hansen and Hodrick results a step further, Fama
(1984)  and Hodrick and Srivastava (1986)  advanced the proposition
that the variance of the risk premium is  greater than the variance
of expected changes in prices and that the two are correlated. In
its extreme form, under the conditions of truly efficient markets,
the proposition implies that the futures price bias consists only
1 In fact, evidence on this point is mixed as will be shown in
the next section.
2For  a survey of literature on the efficiency of the foreign
exchange futures market, see Hodrick (1988).
1of a risk premium. Thus, the use of futures prices for short-term
price forecasting wLll produce biased forecasts, with the biases
being the risk premium. Under such conditions, since prices  are
martingales,  the  naive  forecasts  will  do  better  than  futures
prices. Therefore, to give credit to futures prices as predictors
of  subsequent  price  changes  is  to  admit  market  inefficiency,
nullifying  the  very  rationale  for  their  use.  Thus,  the
informational value of futures prices for forecasting the future
depends  on  the  size  of  the  risk  premium  relative  to  the
expectational error.
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship
between  commodity futures  prices and  price expectations. It focuses
on  the  usefulness  of  futures  prices  as  a  short-term  price
forecasting tool. Recently, Froot and Frankel (1989) used survey
data  on  exchange  rate  expectations  to  estimate  the  relative
importance of risk premium and expectational error in explaining
the forward discount bias in foreign exchange rates. They  found
that, contrary to the claims of Fama and of  Hodrick and Srivastava,
expectational errors dominate the forward discount bias and that
the risk premium is small, relatively stable, and not correlated
with  the expectetional error.  This paper  follows the Froot  and
Frankel  analysis  to  see  if  commodity  prices  exhibit  similar
characteristics.  It  goes  a  step  further  and  estimates  a
relationship  between  futures prices  and  price  expectations,  a
relationship derived from an explicit model of spot and futures
price determination developed by Turnovsky (1983).
The paper is  organized as follows.  The next section summarizes
the characteristics of the forecast  and futures  price data. Section
III tests  the  rationality  of  futures  prices  and  decomposes  the
futures  price  bias.  Section  IV conducts  direct  statistical  tests
of the relative  importance  of risk premium  and expectational  error.
Finally,  a  relationship  between  futures  prices  and  price
expectations  is  estimated  in  Section  V.  The  paper  ends  with  a
summary  and  conclusions.
II.  DATA AND A COMPARISON  OF PERFORMANCE
A. Data
The International  Commodity  Markets  Division  of the World  Bank
has been forecasting the prices of many primary commodities over
the  last  two  decades.  From  the  late  1970s,  the  forecast  interval
has been well established; every two years, forecasts are made for
both  the  short  and  long term  (10-15 years  ahead),  after  extensive
reassessments  of  global  supply  and  demand.  The  forecasts  are
updated  every  six  months,  primarily  focusing  on  the  short-term
outlook.  For  the  purpose  of this  study,  only  the  short-term  (one
year)  forecasts  made durinr.  the 1979-88  period  are used.  At around
2the  mniddle  of each year, the average prices  of commodities expected
to  prevail  in  the  following  year  are  forecast.  The  forecast
horizon, therefore, is about one year.
The choice of the sample period and the forecast horizon were
constrained by the availability of corresponding futures prices,
which were retrieved from the commodity database (DRICOM) of Data
Resources Inc. For each CM forecast, the matching futures price is
the average price of all futures contracts maturing in the target
year of the price forecast and observed during the week when the
forecast was made. Because of the limited availability of flutures
prices, only eight commodities are included in this study; i.e.,
copper, sugar, coffee, cocoa, maize, cotton, wheat, and soybeans.
B. Forecast Performance: A First Comparison
Table  1  lists the  data  in termr  of percentage  changes  in
prices forecast by the CM and futures  markets. Summary statistics
of  the data are shown in Table 2. Percentage changes are measured
in logarithmic  termTs.  Let Pt  denctt.  the logarithm of the spot price
at time t, Etpt+ 1 be the logarithr of the mathematical expectation
of the spot price in t+l conditJonal on the information available
in t, and ft+,t  be the logarithm of the price in t of the futures
contract maturing in  t+l. Then, the percentage changes in the spot,
expected, and futures prices are measured, respectively, by:
APt+1l  =  Pt+1  - Pt;
Apet+,,  =  Etpt+l  - Pt;
Apft+1 i  =  ft+it  Pt-
A  feature  that  stands  out  from  Table  1  is  that  the  CM
forecasts  and  futures  prices  generally  agree  on  the  future
dire tion of price changes. In 50 out of the 72 cases, the sign of
price changes is the same for  both CM forecasts and futures  prices.
A  notable exception  is coffee where  the  signs were  more  often
different than the same. Secondly, the percentage changes forecast
by CM are much larger than those implied  by the futures prices. In
38 of 50 cases where CM and futures markets forecasted prices to
move in the same direction, CM forecast larger percentage price
changes than the futures prices. This  is also shown  in Table 2
where the average percentage changes forecast by CM are often more
than  twice  those  of the  futures prices. Thirdly,  the  standard
deviations of percentage price changes shown in Table 2 are hiuh
compared  with  their  means,  indicating  extreme  volatility  of
commodity prices. It is seen that the actual prices fluctuated much
more widely than those forecasted by CM or the futures prices. In
fact, the futures prices had the least variance, confirming the
underestimation bias mentioned above.
3Table  1: CM For  :asts vs.  Futures  Prices
(percent  per  annum)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
CM Forecasts
Copper  -11.4  7.5  40.0  52.8  3C.6  14.7  4.5  10.9  -15.8
Sugar  35.4  -68.6  22.0  68.3  11.4  45.3  40.5  42.7  62.6
Coffee  -11.5  15.6  16.2  0.3  5.8  2.8  6.5  -8.2  25.6
Cocoa  11.3  30.7  18.6  15.0  -4.4  -10.8  -9.9  3.9  -0.9
Maize  35.0  15.2  22.3  11.5  5.5  -2.9  -2.6  34.3  17.8
Cotton  18.8  -0.9  19.1  20.5  7.4  13.5  14.6  28.2  -10.5
Wheat  29.5  7.1  7.6  13.9  11.3  10.2  -8.6  -14.8  21.0
Soybeans  -12.4  4.3  24.0  16.6  13.8  8.8  9.F  0.5  10.1
Futures  Prices
Copper  -0.1  -11.5  -20.7  14.7  10.3  12.0  -1.4  4.0  -5.1
Sugar  20.4  1.1  10.3  24.5  15.2  34.0  15.8  29.6  18.3
Coffee  3.1  -1.9  -11.1  -22.0  -8.3  -9.0  0.1  6.8  9.3
Cocoa  6.0  4.4  14.4  7.4  5.3  -14.0  1.3  7.0  2.6
Maize  10.3  18.9  20.4  15.7  -6.4  -5.0  1.0  2.5  15.4
Cotton  2.9  -1.0  -1.1  8.6  5.9  2.6  -5.)  11.0  -4.0
Wheat  -9.6  7.7  26.9  14.0  3.6  -2.2  -3.4  -9.4  4.8
Soybeans  -3.3  8.4  9.9  8.3  -0.1  2.3  8.1  1.4  -1.9
Note:  The  years  shown  are the  target  years  of forecasts.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
Table  2: Mean  and Standard  Deviations  of
Forecasted,  Futures,  and  Actual  Price  Changes
&petl,+,  APf  c+1,  I  APt+i,.  iMean
Errors
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
(1)  (2)  (3)  1-3  2-3
Copper  14.9  22.7  7.4  8.5  4.4  21.1  10.5  2.9
Sugar  28.9  40.6  18.8  9.9  8.1  72.3  20.8  10.7
Coffee  5.7  11.5  -3.7  9.9  6.9  23.1  -1.2  -1.1
Cocoa  5.9  14.0  3.8  7.6  -4.1  16.8  10.0  7.9
Maize  15.1  34.0  8.1  10.3  -2.5  21.6  17.6  10.5
Cotton  12.3  11.9  2.2  5.5  -2.0  31.5  14.3  -1.6
Wheat  8.6  13.6  3.6  11.7  3.5  18.5  5.1  -1.6
Soybeans  8.4  10.4  3.7  5.0  -0.2  16.7  8.6  3.9
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
4Forecast errors of the ~M  forecasts and futures prices are
measured, respectively, by:
ret+l  = Etpt+l  pt+-  ;
rft+lt  =  ft+-t  Pt+.i
Means  of  these  forecast  errors  are  provided  in  the  last  two  columns
of Table 2. Since the naive forecasts have zero forecast changes
in prices, their mean forecast error is the negative of the mean
actual price changes (column  3). It is shown that the mean forecast
errors are large for both CM forecasts and the futures prices, but
the CM forecasts have larger  absolute mean errors than the futures
prices for all commodities. In terms of mean forecast errors, the
CM forecasts also have done worse than naive forecasts except for
coffee. However,  they all are not statistically  different from zero
because of large standard deviations. The CM forecasts on average
showed an overestimation  bias compared  with the futures  prices. The
mean forecast error of CM forecasts is positive in nine out of ten
commodities, compared with three out of ten for futures prices.
The mean  forecast error could be a misleading  indi-ator of
forecast accuracy in the sense that large positive and negative
forecast errors do not matter as long as they cancel out. A more
useful indicator of the closeness of the forecasts to the actuals
is the mean of absolute forecast error, which is shown in Table 3.
In terms of mean absolute forecast errors, the CM forecasts beat
the futures prices and naive forecasts for 3 of the 8 commodities.
In any case, the differences between them are r  as pronounced as
those of the simple mean forecast errors shown -iove.
Table 3: Mean Absolute Errors of
CM, Futures, and Naive Forecasts
CM  Futures  Naive
Aret+,,  Arf  t+l,  A  Pt+1. 
Copper  30.0  21.0  17.3
Sugar  47.1  55.0  57.8
Coffee  14.4  21.3  17.7
Cocoa  16.3  13.6  13.0
Maize  23.6  16.9  17.4
Cotton  24.1  20.3  24.5
Wheat  9.5  15.8  14.0
Soybeans  17.2  14.9  12.5
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
5To illustrate the nature of the forecast errors, Charts 1-4
plot  the  expected  (both CM  and  futures) and  actual  percentage
changes  in prices  of  copper, coffee, wheat  and cotton  --  each
commodity  representing  one  of  the  four major  commodity  groups
(metals, beverages, cereals, and agricultural raw materials). It
is  clear that the large positive bias in CM fovecasts resulted from
the  failure to  anticipate  the  severity of  the  commodity  price
depression in  the 1981-86  period. The 1980s started  with relatively
high  commodity  prices.  With  the  economic  recession  in  1982,
commodity prices generally collapsed in 1981/82 and remained at
dismal levels until 1987, except for a minor recovery in 1983/84.
The  severity  of  the  commodity  price  depression  was  largely
unforeseen by most experts. This failure can be explained by the
agents' inability to immediately  recognize and adapt to changes in
the market regime,  which Lewis (1989)  cites as a  cause for forecast
bias that is consistent with rational expectations.
Secondly, whenever the spot price changes significantly, the
CM forecasts tend to come closer to the full extent of the price
change than futures prices. Possible explanations for this could
be that market expectations incorporated in futures  prices are  more
conservative  than  experts' expectations or  that  futures prices
contain risk premia.
III.  RATIONALITY OF  FUTURES PRICES
A. Rationality Test
To test the rationality of futures prices as predictors of
future  spot  prices,  previous  studies  relied  heavily  on  the
regression of changes in spot prices on the futures discount:
Pt+lt  ~=  a  +  )  Apft+ 1 t  +  Et+lt,  (1)
where  the notations are the same as before and ct+lt  is white noise.
The null hypothesis of rationality implies  that a=o and 0=1, i.e.,
the actual change in spot price is the same as anticipated by the
futures price plus a random error term.
Table  4 shows the results of estimating  (1) using ordinary
least squares (OLS).  None of the F-test statistics are significant
at the 5% level, but they are significant  in four of the eight
commodities at the 10% level. For these commodities, the evidence
against the rationality of futures prices seems quite strong when
3  Coffee  (and cocoa to a  lesser extent) has been a major
exception to this price pattern,  maintaining relatively high prices
during 1980-86 before collapsing in 1987-88.
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8the F-statistics are looked at in connection with the t-tests of
the coefficients. These four commodities have estimates of /  that
are significantly differ.nt from one at the 5% level; in three of
the  four,  the  estimates  of  /  are  negative.  Although  not
statistically significant, sugar and coffee have estimates of /
that deviate widely from unity. On the other hand, the hypothesis
that a-0 cannot be rejected for all of the commodities.
Table 4: Rationality of Futures Prices
F-test
Commodities  a  a  t.:P=0  t:P=1  R**2  a-0,0-1
Copper  0.137  -1.235  -1.44  -2.61**  0.12  3.50*
(0.094)  (0.857)
Sugar  -0.565  3.435  1.42  1.01  0.11  0.62
(0.509)  (2.423)
Coffee  0.073  0.105  0.12  1.25  -0.14  1.34
(0.088)  (0.883)
Cocoa  -0.071  0.789  1.02  -0.27  0.01  1.04
(0.063)  (0.772)
Cotton  -0.063  4.640  3.18***  2.49**  0.53  3.14*
(0.083)  (1.459)
Maize  -0.089  0.793  1.08  -0.28  0.02  1.14
(0.093)  (0.735)
Wheat  0.061  -0.256  -0.56  2.73**  -0.09  3.78*
(0.053)  (0.460)
Soybean  0.064  -1 806  -1.72  2.67**  0.20  3.89*
(0.063)  (1.049)
*  Significant at 10% level.  Significant at 5% level.
***  Significant  at  1% level.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
The above result broadly agrees with the findings of previous
studies that overwhelmingly rejected the rationality hypothesis.4
Estimates of /  are often found to be significantly less than one,
and  sometimes  even  negative.  However,  there  have  been  two
diametrically opposite interpretations of the biases. One school
takes it as evidence of irrational expectations; the other adheres
4  Essentially the same results emerged from studies using
different futures price data. These include the Froot and Frankel
study using foreign exchange futures prices; Warr used coiamodity
futures prices.
9to  the assumption of  dtionality of  expectations,  which then  leaves
time-varying risk premia as the only explanation of the biases.
B. Decom osition of Futures Forecast Bias
If  the  marke, expectations incorporated  in futures  prices were
the same as the CM forecasts, it is  possible to calculate the size
of the time-varying risk premium from its definition:
rpt+1L  = Apft+lt  - Apet+it,  (2)
which states that the futures price falls short of the expected
future  spot  price  by  the  amount  of  the  risk  premium.5 In  the
absence of  direct  observations  of market  expectations,  the  CM
forecasts are used for 6pet.i,t  to cormpute  the risk premium.
Froot and Frankel showed that the probability limit of 1  in
the regression of (1)  can be decomposed into two parts, one due to
expectational error and the other arising from the risk premium:
3 - 1 - bre - brPF  (3)
where
bre = ccv(ret+,t,Apft+t)/var(;pft+,,t)
brp  =  £var(rpt+ 1 ,,t)+COV(rpt+ 1 t,Apet+ 1) ]/var(Apft+ 1 ,).
If exnoctations are rational, the expectational errors will
not be correlated with the Intormation set, including the futures
prices,  and  thus  bre=O.  A  zero  risk  premium  implies brp=O. The
available  data  allows  computation  of  both  bre and  brp --  the
contributions,  respectively,  of  expectational  errors  and  risk
premia to the departure of p  from unity.
Table 5 shows the computation results. Generally, it appears
that neither expectational errors not  risk premia  has been  the
consistently dominant  cause of the futures discount bias. In half
of  the  commodities  (copper,  cocoa,  cotton,  and  soybeans),
expectational errors appear to have been  the main  cause of the
forecast biases of futures prices, while in the other half it has
been the risk premia.  This result is in  sharp contrast to the Froot
and Frankel findings that expectational e-rrors  explained most of
the foreign exchange futures discount bias and risk premia were
only of minor importance.  A possible explanation for the different
results could be that commodity prices are much more volatile than
5Since  the seller of a futures contract transfers the price
risk to its buyer, it is argued that a premium should be paid from
the seller to the buyer if  the agents are risk averse. Thus, rptf+,t
in (2)  will be a negative number.
10Table 5: Decomposition of Futures Discount Bias
Commodities  bre  brp  P
(1)  (2)1-)(2
Copper  3.47  -1.27  -1.20
Sugar  -0.36  -2.08  3.44
Coffee  -0.07  0.96  0.11
Cocoa  0.32  -0.11  0.79
Cotton  -3.22  -0.32  4.54
Maize  -0.18  0.39  0.79
Wheat  0.52  0.83  -0.35
Soybean  3.06  -0.25  -1.81
Note: Not all the values of i  here exactly match those in
Table  3  because  of  rounding  errors  and  adjustments  for  the
differences in the prices quoted in the spot and futures trades.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
foreign  exchange  rates  and,  therefore,  the  risk  premium  is
accordingly larger. Like Froot and Frankel, most of the brp's  are
negative, meaning that the risk premium tends to push P  above one.
However, unlike Froot and Frankel, who found the bre  's to be all
positive, our estimates are equally divided between positive and
negative values, suggesting that the CM commodity specialists, in
forming  price  expectations,  have  used  different  weights  for
different commodities on the relative importance of the  current
spot prices vis-a-vis futures prices.
C. Variances of Risk Premium and Expected Price Change
Fama, and Hodrick and Srivastava claim that in the  foreign
exchange market the variance of the risk premium is greater than
the variance of the expected change in prices:
var(6pet+,Jt)  <  var(rpt+i,t).  (4)
Froot  and  Frankel  showed  that,  if  (4) holds  and  Apft,+t and  ret+ 1 ,t
are uncorrelated (i.e., if expectation is rational or br.=O),  then
/<1/2 (or  equivalently brp>l/2).  Since it  was revealed in Tables 4
and 5  that /<1/2 because brp>l/2  and br.=0  only for coffee and wheat,
the  variance  of  risk  premium may  not  be greater  than  that  of
expected  price  changes  for  the  majority  of  the  commodities.
However,  this  test  is valid  only  under  the  condition  of  zero
expectational errors.
Another way of directly confirming  (4) is to calculate the
variances involved, which is done in Table 6. Among the four
11Table 6: Variances of Risk Premium and Forecasted Price Changes
Variances of
Commodities  APt+11  Q  Aft+X1  &pet+,1  rpt+, 1 (3)-(4)
(1)  (.  (3)-  (4)
Copper  0.0480  0.0072  0.0516  0.0260  0.0256
Sugar  0.5224  0.0099  0.1650  0.1140  0.0510
Coffee  0.0533  0.0098  0.0132  0.0223  -0.0091
Cocoa  0.0281  0.0059  0.0197  0.0126  0.0071
Cotton  0.1116  0.0031  0.0142  0.0091  0.0051
Maize  0.0465  0.0106  0.0196  0.0172  0.0024
Wheat  0.0212  0.0137  0.0184  0.0276  -0.0092
Soybean  0.0278  0.0025  0.0107  0.0069  0.0038
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
variances shown, that of actual price changes (column 1) is the
greatest  (the exceptions are copper and wheat); and that of the
futures premium (column  2) is substantially smaller than the rest.
The variance of risk premium  (column 4) is larger than  that of
expected price change (column 3) only for coffee and wheat, which
were also shown to be the case under the assumption of rational
expectations. For the rest of the commodities, the variance of risk
premium is  either substantially  smaller than that of expected price
change  (copper, sugar, cocoa, cotton and soybeans) or is roughly
the same (maize).  The result in  general disputes Fama, and Hodrick
and  Srivastava  proposition  contained  in  the  inequality  (4).
However, Table 6  confirms their claim of covariance between risk
premium  and  expected  price  change.  This  can  be  seen  by  the
relatively large negative  covariance between the two implied by the
variance shown in Table 6.6  In any case, the variances of risk
premium and expected price changes are both sizable,  which deviates
considerably from the Froot and Frankel finding that risk premium
in the exchange markets has been relatively constant, has smaller
variance than expected changes in exchange rates, and probably not
correlated with it.
IV. TESTS OF RISK PREMIA AND EXPECTATIONAL ERRORS
The point estimates in Table 4 of the relative importance of
the risk premia and expectational errors do not lend themselves to
statistical tests of their  significance. Fortunately, there are
direct statistical tests available for the estimates, br,  and brp.
6  The  covariance  between  risk  primium  and  expected  price
change  is equal  to  ((2)-(3)-(4)]/2, where  the  numbers  in  the
parentheses are the column numbers in Table 6.
12A. Tests of Risk Premium
To  test  the  importance  of  risk  premium,  we  run  the  OLS
regression of the following equation:
pet+,  =  C2 +  2 APft+lt  +  eL1t,  (5)
where  the null  hypothesis  to test  is that  futures discount  is
perfectly correlated with expected price changes or 0,=1.  By  virtue
of the identity (2), if (2=1  holds, then futures discount is not
correlated with  risk premium. Since 02=1-b,p,'  2=1  implies bp=O.
Thus, a test of 02=1 is equivalent to a test of brl=0  in Table 4.
Regressions of (5)  can also be used to test the hypothesis that the
risk premium has a mean of zero, i.e.,  2=°0.  The error term in (5)
represents the random error in measuring the market expectation.
Table 7 provides the OLS estimates of  (5). In four of the
commodities  (cocoa,  cotton,  maize,  and  soybeans),  the  null
hypothesis, 132=1,  cannot be rejected, while in the other four, it
is rejected. It should be noted that the commodities for which the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected are the same ones that showed
larger  variances for forecasted price changes than for risk premia
Table 7: Tests of Risk Premium
F-test
Commodities  92  t:32=0.5  t:(3 2=1  R**2  D-W  a=0,  1 2=1
Copper  2.270  3.31**  2.38**  0.68  1.65  4.35*
(0.534)
Sugar  3.079  2.54**  2.05**  0.51  2.53  2.65
(1.016)
Coffee  0.035  -1.06  -2.20**  -.14  2.14  5.03**
(0.439)
Cocoa  1.108  1.10  0.20  0.27  1.83  0.16
(0.553)
Cotton  1.321  1.28  0.50  0.29  2.11  4.69*
(0.064)
Maize  0.614  0.25  -0.84  0.09  2.22  1.60
(0.460)
Wheat  0.166  -0.77  -1.92**  -0.12  1.53  2.39
(0.434)
Soybean  1.250  1.21  0.40  0.28  1.31  1.38
(0.037)
Notes: See Table 3.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
13in Table 6. Three of these four had larger bre  than brp  in Table 5.
Of the other four commodities for which the null hypothesis
is rejected,  three  had  larger  brp  than  brs* Of these  three,  coffee
and wheat  showed  larger variance  of risk premium than expected
price changes  in Table  6. For coffee  and wheat,  therefore, the
preponderance of risk premium seems quite strong.  The only surprise
is copper which showed a predominance of expectational errors but
also a relatively large variance for risk premium.
There is, however, no strong indication of the presence of
non-zero risk premium; the estimates Of a2 (not reported in Table
7) are not significantly different from zero, except for cotton.
Charts 5-8 show the time path of risk premia and forecast errors
of futures prices for copper, coffee, cotton, and wheat. That the
risk premium for these commodities fluctuated over time very much
in line with the forecast errors suggests the presence of time-
varying risk premium that is  correlated with the futures  discount.
The F-test statistic is significant enough to reject a2=Q and
/32=1  for copper, coffee and cotton; sugar and wheat also  show
relatively  high  F  statistic.  For  these  commodities,  the  risk
premium either does not have mean zero or is correlated with the
futures discount, or both.
The regression of (5)  also allows a direct test of the Fama,
and Hodrick and Srivastava claim that the variance  of the risk
premium is greater than that of the futures discount, since the
inequality (4) implies  32<1/2.  Table 7 shows t-tests of /2=1/2.  For
all commodities except for copper and sugar, the null hypothesis
of  32=1/2  cannot be rejected. Thus, even if (4)  does not hold, the
differences in variance of risk premium and expected price change
are not likely to be large for most commodities.
Overall, unlike the results obtained by Froot and Frankel for
exchange rate futures, for  commodity markets the importance of the
risk premium  in explaining the  futures discount bias cannot  be
ruled out. Risk premia could be a significant part of the futures
discount, even if  not the dominant part, and may be correlated with
price expectations.
B. Tests of Expectational Error
The  flip side of the test of risk premium  is the test  of
expectational  error.  Since  a  joint  test  of  risk  premium  and
expectational error is not available, the test of expectational
error  will  provide  independent  evidence  on  its  importance  in
explaining the futures discount bias.  This will be done  in two
steps: first, the rationality of the CM forecasts will be tested
and then a direct test of brO= will be made.
14If the CM forecasts were rational, the biases in the futures
premium would have to be attributed to risk premium. To test the
rationality, we regress the forecast errors on forecasts:
ret+,t  =  a3  +  P 3 Apett+ 1 t  +  et+it,  (6)
where the null hypothesis of rationality implies a3=93=0. Results
of estimating (6)  with OLS are reported in Table 8.
The F-test results indicate that the rationality of the CM
forecasts is rejected only for copper. For cocoa and soybeans, the
test statistics are not significant at the usual  level, but are
high enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level. The
results of t-tests of P3 =0  are not much different; 03=0  is  rejected
only  for  copper,  at  the  5%  significant  level  but  at  the  10%
significance level it is rejected for cocoa and soybeans as well.
The above results are similar to those found in a related study by
Choe (1990).
A  problem  in  estimating  (6) with  OLS  is  that  the  same
(expectation)  variable appears on both sides of the equation. The
error term in (6), therefore, is likely to be correlated with the
independent variable and the OLS  estimates of p 3 may be biased
toward unity. However, the hypothesis that P3 =1  is  rejected for at
least three  of the  commodities, suggesting that  the biasedness
toward unity, if  any, was not a factor for these commodities in  the
test results for rationality.
To circumvent the estimation problem due to  correlation of the
error term with the independent  variable in (6),  we substitute the
futures  discount  for  price  expectations  as  the  explanatory
variable:
-re,+lt  =  a4 +  P4 LPft+lt  +  et+l,t.  (7)
The futures discount can be  viewed as an instrumental  variable that
is independent of the error term in (7).  A test of /4=0  provides a
test of rational expectations in the sense that, if P 4 were found
to be positive, for  example, the CM forecasters  could have improved
the accuracy  of their  forecasts by betting against the  futures
market. In other words, the implication is that the forecasters
have not used the  available futures  market information  efficiently.
Furthermore, regression of (7) provides a convenient direct test
of the point  estimate  of bre  in Table  4, because  0,=bre.
Table  9  shows  the  OLS  estimates  of  equation  (7).  The
rationality hypothesis is rejected for  more of the commodities than
in regressions of equation  (6); the F-test statistics are highly
significant  in rejecting the null hypothesis for copper, cotton,
and soybeans; that  for wheat  is significant at  10%. The t-test
results for p4=0  are similar to those of the F-tests. For copper,
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17Table  8:  Tests  of  Rationality  of  CM  Forecasts
F-test
Commodities  f03  t:  L 3=0  t:0 3=1  R**2  D-W  a3=63=°
Copper  1.276  3.79**  0.82  0.63  1.83  14.37***
(0.337)
Sugar  -0.131  -0.25  -2.18**  -0.13  1.08  0.06
(0.519)
Coffee  -0.120  -0.19  1.78*  -0.14  2.95  0.04
(0.631)
Cocoa  0.751  1.70*  -0.56  0.19  1.09  2.90*
(0.441)
Cotton  -0.840  -1.16  2.55**  0.04  1.96  1.36
(0.721)
Maize  0.470  0.86  -0.97  -0.03  1.89  0.74
(0.546)
Wheat  -0.079  -0.25  3.44***  -0.13  0.80  0.06
(0.314)
Soybean  1.035  1.70*  0.06  0.19  1.19  2.90*
(0.608)
Notes:  See  Table  3.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
Table  9: Tests  of  Expectational  Error
F-test
Commodities  CZ  /4  t:0 4=0  D-W  R**2  C4=04=0
Copper  -0.152  3.470  4.00***  2.72  0.65  16.02***
(0.095)  (0.867)
Sugar  0.275  -0.355  -0.17  1.14  -0.14  0.03
(0.447)  (2.128)
Coffee  -0.014  -0.070  -0.10  3.04  -0.14  0.01
(0.074)  (0.735)
Cocoa  0.088  0.319  0.33  0.87  -0.12  0.11
(0.078)  (0.954)
Cotton  0.213  -3.220  -2.74**  0.86  0.45  7.49**
(0.067)  (1.18)
Maize  0.190  -0.178  -0.23  2.12  -0.13  0.05
(0.098)  (0.780)
Wheat  0.032  0.517  1.68*  1.50  0.18  2.81*
(0.036)  (0.309)
Soybean  -0.026  3.056  3.26***  2.18  0.55  10.64***
(0.056)  (0.937)
Notes:  See  Table  3.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
18cotton and soybeans  (and possibly also for wheat), the bre's  are
significantly different trom zero --  in other words, expectational
errors rather than risk premiums were the main cause of futures
discount  bias.  For  the  other  four  commodities,  however,  the
rationality of CM forecasts cannot be rejected, making risk premia
rather than expectational errors a plausible cause of the futures
forecast bias.
V. FUTURES PRICES AND PRICE EXPECTATIONS
So far, the analysis of futures discount bias has relied on
the identity  (2)  that a futures price is the sum of the expected
price and a risk premium. Thus, the risk premium is calculated as
a residual, which in reality  may include  a variety of factors other
than the lump-sum payment supposedly being paid for assuming the
price risk. One such factor is the error of measuring the market
expectation.  Furthermore, since the  risk premium may  enter  the
futures price relationship in ways other than the simple additive
form in equation  (2), subsequent  decomposition  formulae may be
inadequate to estimate its role.
In this section, we utilize a result in Turnovsky (1983)  that
establishes  a  relationship  between  futures,  spot  and  expected
prices  from  an  explicit  model  of  spot  and  futures  price
determination. Under a standard  set of assumptions,  he showed  that:
F,,,  = w,  Pt + w2 EtPt+ 1. (8)
It states that the future_ price of a commodity in period t for
delivery in t+1, Ft+ 1 t,  is a weighted average of the current spot
price,  Pt, and the price expected to prevail in t+l, E,P,+ 1. The
weights, w,  and W2,  depend on the agents' coefficient of absolute
risk  aversion, the degree  of price variability, and  supply  and
demand parameters. If and only if  the agents are risk neutral, then
Ft+,,t  =  EtPt+ 1,  or w1=O  and  W2=1.  Thus,  a test  of w1=O and  , 2 =1  will
provide a test  of the null hypothesis that the agent  s  are risk
neutral.  Risk  non-neutrality  implies  1>0  and w2<1  and  w1+w2<l.
The equation (8)  above is estimated with OLS, by attaching to
it a  random  error term that represents the errors  in measuring
market expectations. Point estimation of the parameters, w 1 and W 2,
aims to measure the average weights over the sample period; it is
not necessary to assume that the risk premia were constant.  Since
(8) does not have an intercept term,  it is constrained to equal
zero. The results are reported in Table 10.
It is clear that the assumption of risk neutrality has to be
resoundingly rejected for most commodities. In fact, the futures
prices  are  much  closer  to  the  current  spot  price  than  to  the
expected future  price of  the commodity. The restriction that  w 1 +W 2<1
19Table  10: Tests  of Risk  Neutrality
Commodities  t:. 1=O  t:W2=l  D-W  R**2
Copper  0.730  0.268  8.38**  -9.85**  1.56  0.99
(0.087)  (0.074)
Sugar  0.916  0.189  37.94**  -27.87**  2.90  0.99
(0.024)  (0.029)
Coffee  1.112  -0.107  3.37*  -3.50*  0.80  0.99
(0.330)  (0.316)
Cocoa  0.706  0.272  4.39**  -4.89**  3.01  0.90
(0.161)  (0.150)
Cotton  0.785  0.120  7.28**  -9.06**  1.71  0.99
(0.108)  (0.097)
Maize  0.526  0.364  2.12  -2.97*  1.72  0.99
(0.248)  (0.214)
Wheat  0.108  0.669  0.42  -1.39  1.33  0.99
(0.259)  (0.238)
Soybean  0.666  0.256  5.03**  -6.15**  1.88  0.99
(0.132)  (0.121)
*  Significant  at 5% level.  **  Significant  at 1% level.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
for risk non-neutrality  is satisfied  for all commodities  except  for
sugar  and  coffee.  It  appears  that  the  futures  market  for  coffee
has been  moving  counter  to price  expectations;  this  result  may  be
indicative  of a systematic  error  in measuring  market  expectations
that  ran  counter  to the CM forecasts.  The  other  extreme  is wheat,
for  which  the  futureL  prices  most  closely  reflected  the  price
expectations.
It is possible  that the use of CM forecasts  to approximate  the
market  expectations  biased  the estimates  of w.  towards  zero.  In the
regression,  one  may  also  suspect  the  multicollinearity  problem
botween  CM forecasts  and spot prices,  but the significant  estimates
of both w,  and  W2  suggest  that the problem  may not be serious.  Thus,
as  long  as  the  CM  forecasts  are  representative  of  market
expectations,  the  above  estimates  indicate  the  broad  order  of
magnitude  for  the  weights  that  could  be  useful  in  inferring  the
unobservable  market  expectations  from  futures  prices.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
The  quantitative  evidence  in  this  study  suggests  that  the
Froot  and  Frankel  results  obtained  from exchange  rate data  do not
20fully extend  to commodity  markets.  The  results  from commodity  price
forecasts  and  futures  prices  are  mixed.  For  a  subset  of  the
commodities,  the  estimates  here  contradict  t'hose of  Froot  and
Frankel  who  found  uniform  results  across  different  currencies  and
expectational  surveys.  Froot  and  Frankel  attribute  the  uniformity
of their  results  to the perfect  substitutability  of the currencies;
thus,  the exchange  markets  are  essentially  one.  Since  commodities
are  not  perfect  substitutes,  it  is not  surprising  to  find  mixed
results.  Specific  findings  in this paper  are  as follows:
(1) The rational  expectations  hypothesis  is rejected  for about
half  of the commodities  when  futures  prices  are used;  but with  the
CM forecasts, the hypothesis cannot  be rejected except  for one
commodity. Thus, the use of futures prices  for short-term price
forecasting may be more bias-prone than relying on specialists'
forecasts.
(2)  A significant part of the futures forecast bias is due to
the presence of risk premia as well as expectational errors. Thus,
in  order  for  the  futures  prices  to  be  useful  for  short-term
forecasting, the risk premia have to be subtracted from it.
(3) The  size of the  risk premia  could  be  large  i:'  comparison
to the expectational  errors.  The  proposition  that  the variance  of
risk  premia  is  larger  than  that  of expected  price  changes  can  be
rejected  for  the  majority  of  the  commodities,  but  not  the
proposition  that  risk  premia  and  expected  price  changes  are
negatively correlated.
(4) The risk premium  appears to be correlated  with the  futures
discount  for  at  least  half  of  the  commodities,  implying  that  it
could  vary  over time  with  the  price  level.
(5) Futures  prices  tend to move more closely with current  spot
prices  than  with  the  expected  future  prices.  Futures  prices  have
only relatively  small  additional  informational  content  about  price
expectations,  in addition  to what  is incorporated  in the  current
spot price.
The  rejection  of  rationality  here  for  a  subset  of  the
commodities  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  forecasters  used
information  inefficiently or  irrationally. Indeed, most  of  the
forecast  errors are known to have been caused by the changes in the
market  structure  and macroeconomic  environment  that became  evident
to the forecasters only after some delay.
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